Strattec Security Corporation $STRT: Potential Double From Today’s Stock Price

Introduction, Overview of Operations, And Brief History

The company I will be focusing on in this article is Strattec Security Corporation (STRT).  Strattec is a nano cap with a current market cap around $75 million and it is in the very boring and shunned automotive parts industry.  The company has expanded to become a worldwide auto parts supplier through its various joint ventures and alliances.

The company makes and sells various automotive parts such as: Keys with radio frequency identification technology, bladeless electronic keys, ignition lock housings, trunk latches, lift gate latches, tailgate latches, hood latches, and side door latches.  With its acquisition of Delphi Corporation’s Power Products in 2009 it is now also supplying power access devices for sliding side doors, lift gates and trunk lids.

In 2001 Strattec formed an alliance with Witte-Velbert Gmbh.  The alliance allowed Strattec to sell Witte’s products in the US, and allowed Witte to sell Strattec’s products in Europe.  In 2006 the alliance expanded to include ADAC plastics and a joint venture with all three companies owning 33% was formed called VAST or Vehicle Access Systems Technology.  ADAC makes such products as door handles.  The VAST Alliance has helped Strattec become a worldwide auto parts supplier as the alliance allows all companies involved to market and sell each other’s products in various jurisdictions around the world including in the US, Europe, Brazil, China, Japan, and Korea.  The VAST Alliance should have its first profitable year as a company this year which would help Strattec’s bottom line.  Full complement of VAST’s products can be viewed here.

Picture taken from ADAC Plastics which shows how the VAST Alliance is structured.

ADAC and Strattec have formed a separate company, ADAC-Strattec de Mexico, ASdM,  whose operations are in Mexico due to cheaper labor prices, where the two companies separate expertise are combined to manufacture some of the above products for sale. In Strattec’s fiscal years ending 2012 and 2011, ASdM was profitable and represented $31.0 and $25.2 million, respectively of Strattec’s consolidated net sales.

With the help of VAST and its other joint ventures, Strattec’s export sales have risen to 37% of total sales which amounts to $107 million.  In 2001 exports only accounted for 14% of its sales which amounted to $29 million, which illustrates Strattec’s worldwide growth since then.

During the recession three of Strattec’s biggest buyers filed for bankruptcy protection, and the overall auto industry went to the brink of death before being saved by the US federal government.  Because Strattec’s major buyers were having so many problems, it also faced some very serious problems and had its only unprofitable year in 2009, lost more than $40 per share in value during the recession, about 2/3’s of its share price in total, and its share price has not recovered since.

Since that time Strattec restructured, improved its operations and expanded its product lines, signed various joint venture and alliance agreements which have allowed the company to become a worldwide auto parts supplier.  The restructuring, expanded product lines, and worldwide operations have helped Strattec become a more diversified auto parts manufacturer and has grown its sales and margins in the ensuing years.  With the help of VAST and its other joint ventures Strattec is a truly worldwide company with operations now in the US, Europe, Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Canada and Mexico.

Strattec was spun off from Briggs & Stratton in 1995 as an independent company.  After Strattec was spun off from Briggs & Stratton, and through most of its entire history, it enjoyed massive market share of over 60% in the US and a 20% market share of the world’s vehicle lock and key operations.  With its huge hold of the market the company was able to dictate high prices to its buyers which enabled the company to enjoy a competitive advantage for a long period of time.

However, shortly after Strattec was spun off there were massive changes in the lock and key industry which deteriorated the company’s market share and competitive advantages. Due to Strattec’s managements excellent foresight and planning, it was well prepared for the change from basic locks and keys and the diminishing of the amount of locks and keys needed per vehicle, and has transitioned into the electronic key arena as well as expanding its operations into various fields though its partnerships with the VAST Alliance including: Door handles, power doors, trunk latches, lift gate latches, tailgate latches, hood latches, side door latches, ignition lock housings, sliding side doors, lift gates and trunk lids.  Since Strattec’s restructuring during the Great Recession, along with its VAST Alliance and other joint ventures, improved operations, and expanded product lines, Strattec’s sales and margins have both been growing and improving.  The trend of growing sales and margins should continue unless another recession hits.

Excellent Management

Due to the excellent leadership of Harold Stratton II, former CEO and current chairman, current CEO and board member Frank Karecji, and the other members of Strattec’s management team and board of directors, it has been able to adjust its original lock and key operations and changed massively to become a truly worldwide auto parts supplier with the products listed above.

Normally I do not talk much about management in my articles because I usually deem management to be either average or subpar, and as Charlie Munger says I want the business to be simple enough to be able to be run by the proverbial “idiot nephew” so management is generally not a factor in my analysis unless they are doing things that bother me quite a bit.

In this case I wanted to point out that I believe Strattec’s management to be excellent and I think that will continue now that Mr. Stratton has transitioned out of the day to day operations and handed the handling of those over to Mr. Karecji.  For the full view of why I believe Strattec’s management to be excellent I recommend reading its annual reports from 1999 to the present to get the true view of why I think its management has been fantastic, and to get a glimpse of the obstacles management has helped the company overcome to become an even stronger company.  Here is a profile of Mr. Karecji, Strattec’s new CEO from 2010 right after he joined the company.

For those who do not want to read all that information I will list a few pluses from management in recent years that I have not already talked about.

• Strattec has bought back and reduced its shares outstanding by 3.66 million, or more than 50% of its original shares outstanding after being spun off, at a cost of approximately $136 million.
• Most purchases have been at what I think are good prices to do buy backs.  I think now would be an even better time to buy back more shares (Strattec management has authorization to buy back more shares) because of Strattec’s current undervaluation which I will get to later, but I understand that it wants to put money into expanding its operations and product lines.
• Another reason Strattec has not bought any shares back in the past couple years as it has been concentrating on reinstating its dividend and expanding its VAST Alliance operations. The company currently only has 3.3 million shares left that are outstanding.
• Management compensation is fair and straight forward in my opinion which is another plus for management.

Insider and Fund Ownership

• GAMCO Investors-Collectively Mario Gabelli’s Funds-Own 18.6% of Strattec.
• T. Rowe Price and Associates through its Small Cap and Small Value funds own-15.5% of Strattec.
• FMR-Fidelity Management and Research Company own-12.2% of Strattec.
• Vanguard Horizon Funds own-6.2% of Strattec.
• Dimensional Fund Advisors, a Small Cap Value Fund, owns-5.8% of Strattec.
• Insiders Own-7.82% according to Reuters.
• The above insiders and funds own a combined 66.12% of Strattec which partially explains why there is a very low average daily trading volume of around 2,000 shares per day in the stock.

Like I have said in my various other articles I love to see high insider and value oriented fund ownership of the companies I invest in so this is another plus for me.  Another possibility that might arise in the future is that due Strattec only having 3.3 million shares outstanding, its small overall size as a company, and some of the other factors I will mention or have mentioned in the article, I think that Strattec could be taken private or become a potential buy out target for one of the bigger automotive supply companies.

Competitors

The company faces stiff competition from the following three companies.

• Magna International (MGA)-I talked about Magna a bit in my Core Molding Technologies (CMT) article and how I did not think that Magna was a major threat to CMT’s area of operations.  The story as it pertains to Strattec’s operations is different however.  Magna competes with Strattec in several of its product lines including the power access area and Magna appears to be a major player in those areas.  In 2009 Strattec bought the Power Access portion of Delphi’s business segment after it went bankrupt and renamed the unit Strattec Power Access.  For fiscal years ending 2012 and 2011, Strattec Power Access was profitable and represented $62.7 and $62.8 million, respectively of Strattec’s consolidated net sales.  Just for comparison Magna did $1.2 billion in sales just in its closure systems (power access) business in 2011.  Magna could present a problem for future growth of Strattec’s product lines as it will have to compete vigorously on price and quality for contracts.  It could also present a potential opportunity as with CMT, I could see Magna possibly buying out Strattec to expand its operations into more product fields.  This makes further sense since Strattec is such a small company in comparison to Magna and it being an $11+ billion market cap company.
• Huf huelsbeck & fuerst-Huf and its various subsidiaries including Huf North America is a privately held company with operations worldwide and whose product lines compete directly with Strattec’s on almost every product around the world.  This company presents the same problem as Magna does to Strattec, but the same potential buy out opportunity exists as well.
• Tokai Rika-This is a Japanese publically traded company who competes directly with Strattec on several products and who also has operations around the world.  Tokai Rika, like the two companies mentioned before, also dwarfs Strattec in size which could present problems to Strattec’s growth.

Strattec faces much stiffer competition from multiple much bigger competitors, sometimes directly on the same products than CMT did, who I thought carved out a bit of a niche in its industry.

Strattec’s Margins

Gross Margin TTM	18.50%
Gross Margin 5 Year Average	15.32%
Gross Margin 10 Year Average	18.25%
Op Margin TTM	6.20%
Op Margin 5 Year Average	0.44%
Op Margin 10 Year Average	5.18%
ROE TTM	12.11%
ROE 5 Year Average	3.59%
ROE 10 Year Average	9.91%
ROIC TTM	11.90%
ROIC 5 Year Average	3.49%
ROIC 10 Year Average	9.85%
My ROIC Calculation With Goodwill	25.90%
My ROIC Calculation With Goodwill If EBIT% Reverts to 3 Yr Avg	15.41%
My ROIC Calculation Without Goodwill	25.82%
My ROIC Calculation Without Goodwill If EBIT% Reverts to 3 Yr Avg	15.37%
FCF/Sales TTM	2.25%
FCF/Sales 5 Year Average	-3.49%
FCF/Sales 10 Year Average	1.71%
Cash Conversion Cycle TTM	54.43 days
Cash Conversion Cycle 5 Year Average	48.97 days
Cash Conversion Cycle 10 Year Average	42.42 days
P/B Current	0.9
Insider Ownership Current	7.82%
My EV/EBIT If EBIT% Reverts to 3 Yr Avg	5.77
My EV/EBIT Current Unadjusted	3.43
My TEV/EBIT If EBIT% Reverts to 3 Yr Avg	8.09
My TEV/EBIT Current Unadjusted	4.81
Working Capital TTM	$46 million
Working Capital 5 Yr Avg	$48.6 million
Working Capital 10 Yr Avg	$60 million
Book Value Per Share Current	$25.25
Book Value Per Share 5 Yr Avg	$24.54
Book Value Per Share 10 Yr Avg	$24.78
Float Score Current	0.53
Float Intensity	0.77
Debt Comparisons:
Total Debt as a % of Balance Sheet TTM	0.88%
Total Debt as a % of Balance Sheet 5 year Average	0.66%
Total debt as a % of Balance Sheet 10 year Average	0.33%
Current Assets to Current Liabilities	1.79
Total Debt to Equity	45%
Total Debt to Total Assets	22%
Total Obligations and Debt/EBIT	2.1
Total Obligations and Debt/EBIT If EBIT Reverts To 3 Yr Avg	3.53

All numbers were taken from Morningstar or Yahoo Finance unless otherwise noted.  Final four debt calculations are including total debt and obligations.

Margin Conclusion Thoughts

• The very first thing that popped out to me from the above margins is that across the board Strattec has improved its margins, sometimes by multiple percentage points, in comparison to its 5 year and 10 year averages.  Looks like the restructuring that took place during the recession, the various joint ventures including the VAST Alliance, and branching out to new product lines has helped the company immensely.  Improvements in operating margin, ROE, and ROIC have all been especially impressive
• My ROIC calculations make the company look even better as even if Strattec were to revert to its 3 year average EBIT, which I don’t think it will unless another recession happens, I am estimating it to have an ROIC of 15.37% without goodwill.  If Strattec is able to keep up its EBIT margin to current levels I estimate that without goodwill its ROIC is 25.82%, an astounding ROIC margin.
• Also positive as it pertains to ROIC is that in Strattec’s case it is not being artificially inflated by high amounts of debt.
• The cash conversion cycle has gotten worse over the years, meaning less efficiency in the company, which I generally do not like.  That is to be expected in a company that has expanded operations overseas though so no red flag there.
• Its P/B ratio at 0.9 is less than half that of its industry P/B at 2 which means that at least on a relative basis Strattec is undervalued in comparison to its industry.
• My current unadjusted EV/EBIT ratio estimate for Strattec is 3.43.  Unadjusted TEV/EBIT estimate is 4.81.  Generally I like to buy companies selling at an EV/EBIT ratio of 8 or less so again Strattec appears to be undervalued.
• Even if Strattec’s EBIT margin were to revert back to its three year average, which as above I do not think it will do unless there is another recession, its EV/EBIT ratio is 5.77 and TEV/EBIT is 8.09, again undervalued or about fairly valued at worst.
• Book value per share has grown slightly over time, and should grow further with its improved operations.
• The company has minimal debt and even if we include its total contractual obligations and debt its total obligations/EBIT ratio is a paltry 2.1.  Much improved from some of the other companies I have evaluated and its current total debt and obligations should be nothing to worry about going forward.

Below numbers in graphs are taken from Morningstar.

As you can see in the above graphs Strattec’s share price has not improved as its operations and sales have.  The last year Strattec had comparable margins to what it had this year is 2006, when Strattec was selling for between $33 and $50 a share. As I found after doing my valuations, which I will show below, I think Strattec should be selling somewhere in that range now.  Sales are actually almost $100 million more than they were in 2006, and margins should continue to improve as Strattec’s now worldwide operations and expanded product lines become more efficient.

Valuations

These valuations were done by me, using my estimates and are not a recommendation to buy stock in any of the companies mentioned.  Do your own homework.

Valuations were done using 2012 10K and 2013 first quarter 10Q.  All numbers are in millions of US dollars, except per share information, unless otherwise noted.

Low Estimate Of Intrinsic Value

				Numbers:
Revenue:				284
Multiplied By:
Average 3 year EBIT %:				3.77%
Equals:
Estimated EBIT of:				10.71
Multiplied By:
Assumed Fair Value Multiple of EBIT:				8X
Equals:
Estimated Fair Enterprise Value of STRT:				85.68
Plus:
Cash, Cash Equivalents, and Short Term Investments:				12.94
Minus:
Total Debt:				1.5
Equals:
Estimated Fair Value of Common Equity:				97.12
Divided By:
Number of Shares:				3.3
Equals:				$29.43 per share

Base Estimate Of Intrinsic Value

Assets:	Book Value:	Reproduction Value:
Current Assets
Cash And Cash Equivalents	16.3	12.94
Accounts Receivable (Net)	45.1	38.34
Inventories	25.5	15.3
Other Current Assets	17.1	8.6
Total Current Assets	104	75.18
Deferred Income Taxes	9.7	4.9
Investments In Joint Ventures	8.4	4.2
Other Long Term Assets	0.5	0
PP&E Net	47.6	28.6
Total Assets	170.6	112.88

Number of shares are 3.3

Reproduction Value

• 112.88/3.3=$34.21 per share.

High Estimate Of Intrinsic Value

Cash and cash equivalents are 12.94

Short term investments are 0

Total current liabilities are 57.8

Number of shares are 3.3

Cash and cash equivalents + short-term investments – total current liabilities=12.94-57.8=-44.86

• -44.86/3.3=-$13.59 in net cash per share.

Strattec has a trailing twelve month EBIT of 18.

5X, 8X, 11X, and 14X EBIT + cash and cash equivalents + short-term investments:

• 5X18=90+12.94=102.94/3.3=$31.19 per share.
• 8X18=144+12.94=156.94/3.3=$47.56 per share.
• 11X18=198+12.94=210.94/3.3=$63.92 per share.
• 14X18=252+12.94=264.94/3.3=$80.29 per share.

From this valuation I would use the 8X EBIT+cash estimate of intrinsic value of $47.56 per share.

I discounted the cash a bit in the above valuations because about 55% of Strattec’s cash is in Mexico so if Strattec wanted to bring the funds to the US it would have to pay taxes on that portion of cash.

1. Strattec is undervalued by 23% using my low estimate of value, which assumes that Strattec will revert back to its 3 year average EBIT margin, which as I stated above, I do not think will happen unless there is another recession.  This is the absolute minimum I think Strattec should be selling for.
2. Strattec is undervalued by 33% using my base estimate of intrinsic value on a pure asset reproduction basis.
3. Strattec is undervalued by 52% using my high estimate of intrinsic value with EBIT and cash at current levels.  Now that Strattec has restructured itself and made itself a worldwide company with expanded product lines and improved operations I actually think that EBIT should rise over time meaning Strattec’s intrinsic value could continue to grow and it would become even more undervalued.

Pros

• Strattec has excellent management.
• The company is undervalued by every one of my estimates of intrinsic value above and relative valuation estimates such as P/B, EV/EBIT, and TEV/EBIT.
• Strattec restructured before and during the recession to cut costs, expand product lines, and became more efficient and less dependent on one single product line.
• Strattec signed joint ventures, and created the VAST Alliance with two other companies that now allow Strattec to compete on a global scale.
• Strattec’s margins have improved across the board in comparison to its 5 and 10 year averages and margins should continue to improve.
• Sales have also been improving along with margins.
• Strattec has almost zero debt.
• Strattec management owns just fewer than 8% of the company.
• Most importantly as it pertains to management is that I trust that they have shareholders best interests in mind.
• Various value and small cap oriented funds own more than 50% of the company, including Mario Gabelli’s funds.
• The VAST Alliance as a company should have its first profitable year this year which should help Strattec’s profitability even more.
• My personal estimates of ROIC show that Strattec is even more profitable than I originally thought while looking at Morningstar’s numbers.
• Strattec has a $25 million revolving credit facility if it wants to do any acquisitions, which the new CEO has said he will look into, or the $25 million could be used in an emergency situation if one arises.
• Margins are not artificially inflated by debt so margins show a true picture of how Strattec is running.
• Strattec has drastically reduced its share count in the past decade at what I think were good prices to be buying at.
• Strattec is currently authorized to buy back more shares if it chooses to.
• Strattec recently reinstated its quarterly dividend.

Cons

• Strattec is highly dependent on only a few customers for its orders as General Motors, Ford, and The Chrysler Group combine for 68% of sales.
• Strattec is highly dependent on how well the automotive industry and the overall economy as a whole are doing which can be seen in the above graphs.
• Due to the cyclical nature of Strattec, if there is another recession or major problems in the auto industry again, its sales and profitability will be highly affected.
• The company has some very stiff and much bigger competition.  The competition could possibly mean further price cuts on products in Strattec’s product lines if some kind of price war starts.
• Due to competition and the overall cost reduction plans put into place by the big automotive companies, Strattec has had to drop prices on its products in recent years.
• At this point I do not see any kind of long term sustainable competitive advantages within Strattec.

Catalysts

• Since Strattec is very small in comparison to its competitors it could become a potential buy out candidate.
• Strattec’s margins should continue to grow which could lead to the unlocking of value.
• The new CEO Frank Karecji has said that he would like to do some kind of acquisition in the short term.
• Strattec is authorized to buy back more shares.

Conclusion

With all of the above taken into account, I think that the absolute minimum Strattec should be selling for is $29.43 per share which assumes that Strattec’s EBIT margin will revert to its 3 year average.  I think that Strattec’s true intrinsic value is somewhere between $35 and $45 per share.  None of that is even taking into account that its sales and margins should continue to grow which would also grow the company’s intrinsic value.

The company does face some headwinds to future growth as I outline above, the biggest ones in my opinion is that Strattec has to compete with various bigger companies and I do not see any kind of long term sustainable competitive advantages within the company.

Normally I would want some kind of sustainable competitive advantage within a company that I am buying as a long term value hold, but at current valuations, with Strattec’s good and rising margins and other factors listed throughout the article, I think the risk/reward is in my favor by a substantial margin and I have already bought shares for my personal account and the accounts I manage making this only the fourth company I have bought into this year.

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Core Molding Technologies Valuations and Analysis

This is the entire article I have been working on which has been posted this morning to Valuefolio.com for his 50 Stocks in 100 Days Valuation series. I hope you enjoy all the new things I have added to my analysis and the amount of research I have done for this company.  Due to what I found out about Core Molding Technologies while researching, valuing, and analyzing them, CMT has become only the third companies stock I have bought in the past year along with Vivendi and Dole.  Let me know what you think about the article.

This is a guest post by Jason Rivera, founder of Value Investing Journey, a value investing blog. The tone of honesty and humility at his blog is refreshing. His quest for great stocks and as a value investor results in unique, authentic, high-quality content. In this article he values Core Molding Technologies as part of our 50 Stocks in 100 Days series. Follow Jason on twitter @JMRiv1986. 

For those of you who have not viewed my site and other analysis articles, I hope you enjoy my analysis and valuations, if not let me know where I am going wrong and what I could do better.  For those of you who have visited my site and have seen my valuations, I hope you like some of the tweaks I have made in my analysis.  I am now doing even more thorough research than I have been doing and I have incorporated some new things into my write ups as well, I hope you enjoy.

Core Molding Technologies (CMT) is going to be the subject of this article.  Core Molding Technologies is a manufacturer of fiberglass reinforced plastic products.  They supply products to companies in the medium and heavy trucking, automotive, marine, and other commercial industries.  The plastics are used in automobile hoods, air deflectors, air fairings, splash panels, engine covers, fenders, and bulkheads. They have five production facilities in: Columbus, Ohio; Batavia, Ohio; Gaffney, South Carolina; Warsaw, Kentucky; and Matamoros, Mexico.

Core Molding Technologies has about 90% of its current business coming from the medium and heavy trucking industry.  Sales to Paccar and Navistar make up about 75% of current sales as of the most recent quarter.  CMT has been slowly trying to increase sales to other companies, which I think is a good thing in the long term because if its relationship deteriorates with either of the above two companies CMT could be devastated.  CMT states that its current relationship with both Paccar and Navistar are good and that they work closely with both companies to solve any issue, work on research and development, and pricing.

As of this year’s proxy form, Navistar currently has a seat on CMT’s board of directors as it is owns 9.2% of CMT’s stock, so I do not see Navistar ending its relationship with CMT any time soon.  CMT insiders own around 16% of the company’s stock.  Mario Gabelli personally, and through his funds owns 14.1% of CMT’s stock.  Rutabaga Capital owns 9.5% of its stock.  Rutabaga is a private investment firm whose concentration is in “Undervalued, unloved companies.”

I always like to see high insider ownership, and I am happy that CMT is owned by a couple value oriented investment firms.  I was especially happy to see that Mario Gabelli is a big owner of CMT’s stock, especially since he has bought shares in the company with his own money.  I also really like the ownership by Navistar as that could lead to a potential buy out, or at the very least a continued partnership between the two companies.  I am going to be watching very closely to see if and when any of the above start selling CMT’s stock as that could be a sign that there are big problems ahead for the company.

Here are some quotes from two of CMT’s biggest buyers about the potential huge catalyst in CMT’s main area of operations, the trucking industry:

• From Paccar, “Over six million heavy duty trucks operate in North America and Europe, and the average age of North American vehicles is estimated to be seven years. The large vehicle parc and aging industry fleet create excellent demand for parts and service and moderate the cyclicality of truck sales.”
• From Navistar “For our Truck segment, we expect benefits from further improvements in our “traditional” volumes as the industry continues to increase from the historic lows experienced in 2009 and 2010. According to ACT Research, the average age of the truck fleet was 6.7 years at the beginning of 2011, which is the highest average age since 1979. We anticipate higher sales in 2012 for truck replacement as our customers refresh aging fleets. We also expect demand for trucks to increase as freight volumes and rates continue to improve as the economy recovers. In addition to increased demand, we expect to further benefit from improved revenues and margins associated with the exclusive use of our proprietary engines. We expect to realize benefits from plant optimization actions taken during the trough of the truck cycle. Finally, we anticipate positive contributions from business acquisitions and investments made during this period.”

The above is exceptional news and should serve as a catalyst for CMT.

These valuations were done by me, using my estimates, and are not a recommendation to buy any stock, in any of the companies mentioned.  Do your own homework.

All numbers are in millions of US dollars, except per share information, unless otherwise noted.  Valuations were done using 2011 10K and second quarter 2012 10Q.

Asset Reproduction Valuation

Assets:			Book Value:		Reproduction Value:
Current Assets
Cash & Cash Equivalents			0		0
Accounts Receivable (Net)			26.3		20
Inventories			12.6		6
Deferred Tax Asset			1.8		0
Other Current Assets			2.8		0
Total Current Assets			43.5		26
PP&E Net			51.9		25
Deferred Tax Asset			1.1		0
Goodwill			1.1		0
Total Assets			97.6		51

 

I am using the companies fully diluted share count of 7.4.

• 51/7.4=$6.89 per share.

EBIT and Net Cash Valuation

Cash and cash equivalents are 0

Short term investments are 0

Total current liabilities are 27

Cash and cash equivalents + short-term investments – total current liabilities=0+0-27=-27

• -27/7.4=-$3.65 in net cash per share.

CMT has a trailing twelve month unadjusted EBIT of 16.5.

5X, 8X, 11X, and 14X EBIT + cash and cash equivalents + short-term investments:

• 5X16.5=82.5
• 8X16.5=132
• 11X16.5=181.5
• 14X16.5=231

• 5X=82.5/7.4=$11.15 per share.
• 8X=132/7.4=$17.84 per share.
• 11X=181.5/7.4=$24.53 per share.
• 14X=231/7.4=$31.22 per share.

Since CMT has had a record trailing twelve months in terms of EBIT, I have decided to normalize EBIT and taken the 10 year average of 8.2 to determine the more normalized intrinsic value of CMT in case it is not able to keep up the pace of the past year.

• 5X8.2=41
• 8X8.2=65.6
• 11X8.2=90.2
• 14X8.2=114.8

• 5X=41/7.4=$5.54 per share.
• 8X=65.6/7.4=$8.86 per share.
• 11X=90.2/7.4=$12.19 per share.
• 14X=114.8/7.4=$15.51 per share.

Revenue and EBIT valuation

I am again using trailing twelve month numbers.

				Numbers:
Revenue:				168
Multiplied By:
Average 10 year EBIT %:				6.69%
Equals:
Estimated EBIT of:				11.24
Multiplied By:
Assumed Fair Value Multiple of EBIT:				8X
Equals:
Estimated Fair Enterprise Value of CMT:				89.92
Plus:
Cash, Cash Equivalents, and Short Term Investments:				0
Minus:
Total Debt:				13
Equals:
Estimated Fair Value of Common Equity:				76.92
Divided By:
Number of Shares:				7.4
Equals:				$10.39 per share.

 

My low estimate of value using a 5X EBIT multiple was $5.84 per share.  My high estimate of value using an 11X EBIT multiple was $14.95 per share.

Price to Book and Tangible Book Valuation

				Numbers:
Book Value:				53.13
Minus:
Intangibles:				2.2
Equals:
Tangible Book Value:				50.93
Multiplied By:
Industry P/B:				2.2
Equals:
Industry Multiple Implied Fair Value:				112.05
Multiplied By:
Assumed Multiple as a Percentage of Industry Multiple:				95%
Equals:
Estimated Fair Value of Common Equity:				106.45
Divided By:
Number of Shares:				7.4
Equals:				$14.39 per share

 

My low estimate of value using 75% of industry multiple was $11.36 per share.  My high estimate using 125% of industry multiple was $18.93 per share.

Ratios

				Ratios
Current Assets to Current Liabilities:				1.59
Total Debt to Equity:				23.60%
Total Debt to Total Assets:				12.30%
ROIC 10 yr avg From Morningstar:				10.62%
Unadjusted ROIC TTM :				24.60%
Normalized ROIC:				12.23%
Cash Conversion Cycle TTM:				54.47
Unadjusted EV/EBIT:				3.93
Normalized EV/EBIT:				8
ROE 10 yr avg:				15.73%
ROETTM:				21.10%
ROA 10 yr avg:				6.56%
ROA TTM:				11.49%
COGS as a % of revenue 10 yr avg:				83.36%
COGS as a % of revenue 2011:				79.16%

 

My Interpretation of the Ratios:

• I do not see any current problems with CMT’s debt levels.
• CMT’s ROIC is incredible, even if they fall back to the more normalized levels of above 10%.  If CMT can keep up the level of the previous year this company is very undervalued.
• The cash conversion cycle is a measure of how fast a company can turn its inventories into cash.  In CMT’s case it takes them about 54.5 days to make the conversion.  The number is lower than the high of about 73 in 2009, but not back to pre recession levels which were around 42 on average.  I do not see a major problem here but would like to see the number creep down over time.
• If CMT can keep its current revenue and profit levels going then they appear to be massively undervalued on an EV/EBIT basis.  If they revert back to the 10 year average EBIT then they appear to be about fairly valued on that basis.
• ROE and ROA appear to be boosted recently in comparison to the 10 year average in part due to Cost of Goods Sold decreasing as a percentage of revenue.  Hopefully they can keep up that pace as well.

Competitors

The competitors that CMT lists in its annual and quarterly reports are as follows: Sigma Industries, Decoma Composites (an owned subsidiary of Magna International), Molded Fiber Glass Companies, and Continental Structural Plastics.  Here are my thoughts on each competitor after doing research on them.

• Sigma Industries has operations in various industries including the heavy trucking industry, where CMT gets most of its sales from currently.  Sigma’s operations are mainly in Canada currently so it appears not be too much competition for CMT at this time.
• Magna International (MGA) is one of the largest and most diversified auto parts suppliers in the world.  I was a bit worried about the competition from Magna towards CMT, but the company currently does not make sales in the medium and heavy trucking segment.  Magna’s main operations are in cars and light trucks at this time.  Magna does state in its 10K that they are always looking for opportunities in various arenas including the heavy trucking industry, Magna’s entry into the heavy trucking industry would be something to watch out for. I think that Magna buying out CMT would be a better option because currently CMT has a market cap of around $50 million and Magna’s is $10.4 billion, meaning it would be a very minimal monetary investment and would also save them time from having to learn the processes by themselves.
• Molded Fiber Glass Companies is a privately held company whose operations appear to be mostly in the automotive and wind energy arena.  The little Molded Fiber Glass does in the trucking industry does not appear to be in direct competition with CMT as its operations are in entirely different states and regions.
• Continental Structural Plastics is a privately held company who has operations in automotive, heavy truck, agricultural, HVAC, construction, and material sales.  The following is the best information I could find on Continental “Continental Structural Plastics, Inc. manufactures structural plastic components, bumper beam reinforcements, rocker covers, oil pans, stamped steel seat frames, and underbody shields. It also offers composite seat bases, engine oil sumps, and composite sunshade substrates; and moulders of glass-mat thermoplastic composites, as well as long-glass-fibre-reinforced thermoplastic and direct-LFT composites. The company was founded in 1982 and is based in Troy, Michigan with manufacturing plants in Petoskey, Michigan; and Sarepta, Louisiana.”  Again, CSP does not appear to be a direct competitor in to CMT as they appear to make different products.

After looking into CMT’s competitors it appears that it does not have a direct competitor at this time and that it has found a very profitable niche which also might come with some minor competitive advantages.

Pros

• Undervalued by almost every one of my estimates of intrinsic value.
• I have not found any major direct competitors in CMT’s main area of operations.
• The company has found a niche in its industry that has made them very profitable.
• The company’s margins have been consistently good to great over the last 10 years: ROIC 10% average over that time period for example.
• Even if CMT is not able to keep up the pace of the previous year in terms of revenue and margins and reverts back to its 10 year averages, the company has been profitable over that time, even during the recent recession.
• Navistar, who is CMT’s biggest customer, owns about 9% of the company.  CMT insiders, outside value investment firms including Mario Gabelli personally, and through his funds, own over 30% of the company.
• By my estimation, the company looks like a potential buy out candidate.
• The company has been becoming more efficient in its operations in recent years.

Cons

• The vast majority of CMT’s sales are to only two companies, and they would be devastated if its relationship with either of the two companies deteriorates.
• CMT is a very small company whose market cap is currently only around $50 million.
• CMT could be hurt if a bigger, better financed, company enters its industry.
• On a revenue and margins level, CMT has had a record past year which might not continue into the future.
• If the past holds true, CMT’s results will be hurt quite a bit by any kind of recession or down turn in the economy.
• CMT has very low average trading volume of around 15,000, so it could experience wild swings in price.

Potential Catalysts

• The trucking industry currently has the highest average age of trucks since 1979 which should lead to sustained sales and margin growth.  The high age of the current trucking fleet should at least partially protect CMT’s revenues and margins if there is some new recession, as you can only hold off buying a new truck for so many years and many companies held off buying trucks during the recent recession.
• In my opinion CMT would be a great buyout candidate for someone like Magna who would be interested in entering the medium and heavy trucking industry as that would be less of a money and time investment for any potential buyer.
• Navistar who already owns more than 9% of the company also could be a potential buyer.

Conclusion

With all of the above stated I will be using my trailing twelve month unadjusted 5X EBIT estimate of intrinsic value of $11.15 per share.  The reason I am using this estimate of value is that by my estimation CMT should be able to at least partially sustain the previous year’s record revenue and margin numbers.  The 5X EBIT estimate is also conservative enough that it leaves a margin of safety if CMT were to revert back to previous year’s revenue and margins.

I actually think that CMT should be valued at one of my higher estimates of value due to the steadiness of its margins over the past decade and some of the other factors listed above, but I chose this estimate of intrinsic value due to the company’s small size and some of the other risks listed above, just to be safe.

The current share price is $7.35 which gets me a margin of safety of about 35%, reaching my minimum threshold of 30%.

Due to the previous, and for the reasons I listed throughout my article, I have decided to buy into CMT, making it only the third company I have bought this year along with Vivendi and Dole.

If you liked this analysis please visit my value investing blog Value Investing Journey and follow me on Twitter @JMRiv1986.  As always your comments, critique, and criticism are welcome.  Let me know what you think I could do better, where I might have gone wrong, and what you liked about the analysis.

Last minute update as I am getting ready to publish.  Navistar’s CEO of 30+ years has stepped down effective immediately.  This situation is something I am going to watch very closely, but with the information that is currently available I still have decided to buy into CMT at this time.  Hopefully this situation will not affect Navistar’s relationship with CMT.